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Educational differentials in cohort fertility during the fertility 
transition in South Korea 
Sam Hyun Yoo1 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
While there has been a considerable amount of research on the association between 
women’s education and fertility rates, few of these studies have examined the pattern of 
fertility differentials over the course of the fertility transition. As a country that has 
experienced a rapid decline in fertility and marked improvements in women’s 
educational attainment over the last several decades, South Korea represents an ideal 
case for studying this dynamic association. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The aim of the article is to explain the pattern of fertility differentials by level of 
education and the contribution of the changes in women’s educational attainment to the 
fertility decline during the fertility transition in South Korea. 
 
METHODS 
Drawing upon data from the Korean censuses conducted between 1970 and 2010, I 
analyze completed cohort fertility for women born between 1926 and 1970 using 
demographic-decomposition techniques and cohort parity progression ratios by level of 
education. 
 
RESULTS 
The differences in fertility by educational attainment have gradually declined over the 
transition, with fertility almost converging at a low level among recent birth cohorts. 
Fertility in South Korea had been declining in all of the social groups until the sub-
replacement fertility was reached. The change in women’s educational attainment then 
became an important factor in the further decline in fertility. The trend toward fewer 
children quickly spread from the most educated to the least educated women throughout 
the fertility transition. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The transformation of fertility behaviors across social strata has been a key element in 
the Korean fertility transition. Although educational expansion, particularly the 
introduction of mass education, has contributed to falling fertility in South Korea, the 
role of education in fertility decline is more pronounced in the diffusion of innovative 
ideas and behaviors, which reduced fertility differentials across social strata. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Women’s education is usually associated with lower fertility at both the population and 
the individual levels (Bongaarts 2003; Caldwell 1982; Castro Martín 1995; Cochrane 
1979; Jeffery and Basu 1996; Jejeebhoy 1995). However, the empirical association 
between changes in educational levels and changes in fertility rates at the population 
level is more complex. Educational change is associated with a range of economic and 
social changes which can alter the link between education and childbearing and/or the 
intensity of the link. As a result, although rising education generally leads to falling 
birth rates, the importance of educational trends varies. For instance, compositional 
change in education levels was found to account for 70% of the decline in fertility in 
Brazil between the 1935–1939 and 1951–1953 birth cohorts (Lam and Duryea 1999), 
but only about one-third of the decline in fertility between 1980 and 2000 in Iran 
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). The impact of educational change likely depends on the 
starting levels of education and fertility, as well as other contextual factors. Despite the 
theoretical importance of education as a contributing factor in the fertility transition, 
there have been relatively few longitudinal studies on education and fertility. 
In this article, I use census data from South Korea to analyze changing associations 
between education and fertility, and look at how compositional changes in education 
contributed to the decline in fertility across the transition from a high to a lowest-low 
level. South Korea (hereafter Korea) experienced one of the fastest fertility declines in 
the world. The Korean total fertility rate was 6.0 in the 1960s, but it had plummeted to 
sub-replacement levels by 1983 (Statistics Korea 2014). It took Korea less than 25 years 
to go from a pre-transitional stage to sub-replacement levels of fertility. In England, by 
contrast, this process took almost 130 years. Over that period, there were marked 
improvements in women’s education. The college entrance rate among female high 
school graduates was 22.2% in 1980, but had reached nearly 80% by the late 2000s 
(Statistics Korea 2010). Among the 1960 birth cohort, the proportion of women who 
had graduated from high school was negligible; but among the 1970 birth cohort, the 
share was more than 95%. The combination of a dramatic decline in fertility and a rapid 
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increase in women’s education makes the country an ideal case for studying this 
relationship during the fertility transition. Given the general association between 
fertility and education, we can hypothesize that the expansion of women’s education 
was a major factor that contributed to the rapid transition from high to low fertility rates 
in Korea.  
In this paper, I explore educational differentials in fertility and the changes over 
the course of the fertility transition in Korea. I briefly review theories on these 
differences by educational level and describe the Korean fertility transition. In the 
results section, I first display the trend of educational differentials in completed cohort 
fertility among women born between 1926 and 1970, and then examine the association 
between changes in fertility and in the composition of women’s educational attainment 
levels. I also analyze the education-specific pattern of falling fertility over the 
transition. The key findings and their implications are discussed in the final section. 
Throughout this paper, I utilize completed cohort fertility to measure fertility instead of 
the period total fertility rate (TFR), which is often distorted or underestimated in places 
like Korea, where ages at childbearing change rapidly (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). 
This paper contributes to the literature on the association between women’s education 
and fertility, and has implications for population policies in both developing and 
developed countries. 
 
 
2. Educational differentials in fertility over the fertility transition 
Despite the long-standing interest among researchers in the association between 
education and fertility, few theories on how educational differentials change over time 
have been offered. Bongaarts (2003) summarized the changes in educational 
differentials over different stages of the fertility transition, and suggested two 
theoretical models: (1) the “leader-follower” model and (2) the “permanent difference” 
model. Cleland (2002) also described the first as a “temporal model.” According to the 
leader-follower model, fertility declines among highly educated women, and then less 
educated women follow their example. As the fertility decline begins, the gap in 
fertility widens between the higher and lower educational groups. These educational 
differentials then diminish as the transition progresses. Due to the staggered diffusion 
process, fertility behaviors gradually become similar across educational groups. Thus, 
fertility differentials by level of education are considered transient in this model 
(Cleland 2002). The underlying assumption is that innovations such as the norm of a 
small family size and the use of birth control emerge among an elite group and then are 
diffused across the social strata. 
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In contrast, the permanent-difference model posits that educational differentials 
remain significant throughout the transition. This model, which builds on the 
microeconomic perspective that fertility is influenced by socioeconomic conditions 
(e.g., Becker 1981), sees the fertility decline as an adaptation to changes in the 
economic and the social structures (Carlsson 1966; Davis 1945; Notestein 1953). In this 
model, falling fertility is largely attributable to socioeconomic changes. A rise in 
educational attainment directly contributes to a fertility decline when the negative 
association between fertility and education remains constant. As a result, the fertility 
differentials by education persist at the end of the transition, even though the overall 
fertility rate decreases while the overall level of education increases. 
The two models described above are essentially hypothetical and represent 
extreme cases. In reality, most cases fall between these two extremes because education 
is not only a primary determinant of fertility; it also functions as a pathway for the 
transmission of social norms and behaviors. The ways in which education influences 
fertility are so numerous (see Cleland 2002 for a comprehensive review) that structural 
effects alone cannot explain contemporary fertility decline. For the same reason, the 
indirect educational effects on fertility may be much greater than expected (Caldwell 
1980). The literature also suggests that any efforts to explain the decline in fertility over 
the course of the transition should take into account both structural and diffusion effects 
(Bras 2014; Casterline 2001; Cleland 2001). Interestingly, scholars disagree about 
which model is empirically supported and how the fertility differentials end (James, 
Skirbekk, and Bavel 2012; Jeffery and Basu 1996; Lutz and Goujon 2001). For 
instance, Cleland (2002) argued that in most societies fertility differentials by education 
should shrink over time and converge at the end of the transition. He thus favored the 
leader-follower model (the “temporal” model in his terminology). By contrast, 
Bongaarts (2003), concluded based on his own analysis that the permanent-difference 
model is more supported because fertility differentials by education usually remain 
significant even in post-transitional countries. 
These theoretical considerations regarding the changes in educational differentials 
in fertility have, however, rarely been tested. While the research described above 
examined several countries in late- and post-transitional phases, these studies focused 
primarily on less developed countries and relied on period measures of fertility 
(Bongaarts 2003, 2010; Cleland 2002). The mixed conclusions of these scholars may be 
attributable to the lack of evidence of a pattern of fertility differentials over the entire 
course of the transition, especially in the post-transitional phases. The literature has 
suggested that different patterns of fertility differentials appear in different phases of the 
transition. For instance, despite the inverse relationship between fertility and education, 
the size of fertility differentials by education tends to decline in late-transitional 
societies. (Bongaarts 2010; Castro Martín 1995; Chackiel and Schkolnik 1996; Shapiro 
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2012). Similarly, Skirbekk (2008) found that fertility differentials across social strata 
become smaller as fertility gets closer to replacement level, although women’s 
education has historically had a negative relationship with fertility. 
Fertility differentials by education may vary in developed countries. For instance, 
in Nordic countries the inverse association between fertility and level of education has 
substantially weakened among recent cohorts (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008), and is often 
reversed when the age at childbearing is controlled for (Andersson et al. 2009). The 
evidence from Nordic countries contradicts the permanent-difference hypothesis, and 
also clearly demonstrates that the existing theory is insufficient to cover all kinds of 
educational differentials in fertility. Prior research seems to have overlooked the new 
demographic changes that occur in countries in the post-transitional stages, or in the 
“Second Demographic Transition” (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 
1986). As period fertility rates drop below the replacement level, the fertility 
differences by level of education decrease in absolute value. Contraceptives, which are 
used to explain fertility differentials by social strata, are readily available in most 
developed countries. However, economic recession and labor market insecurity tend to 
prevent young women from having large families. As a result, the fertility differentials 
by level of education in developed countries may be marginal or smaller than previous 
studies have predicted.  
It is not clear whether the negative association between education and fertility 
diminishes or becomes reversed in the late and post-transitional stages, but it is apparent 
that the intensity of the association changes over the fertility transition. The dynamic 
features of this association have so far been underexplored. In this paper, I provide 
empirical evidence on the dynamic changes of fertility differentials by level of 
education using data covering the entire period of transition from well above 
replacement level to well below replacement level. I assess the contribution of changes 
in women’s educational attainment to changes in completed fertility, and demonstrate 
how the trend toward having fewer children was transmitted across levels of education. 
 
 
3. The fertility transition in South Korea 
As the fertility transition in Korea has been described elsewhere (e.g., Kim and Kim 
2004), I will outline it only briefly here. The fertility decline in Korea can be divided 
into three stages: a pre-transitional stage before the 1960s, a fertility transition between 
1960–1985, and a post-transitional stage since 1985. Figure 1 depicts the total fertility 
rate in Korea between 1970 and 2010. Fertility in Korea did not decline until the early 
1960s, and during that period the total fertility rate (TFR) remained at around 6.0 or 
above. However, the TFR increased somewhat in the late 1950s during the baby boom 
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following the Korean War (1950–1953). International aid, which included the provision 
of antibiotics during and after the war, significantly reduced mortality, especially 
among infants and children. Factors such as an increase in population density in urban 
areas due to an inflow of war refugees, extreme poverty, and uncertain political 
situations caused by the Korean War drove young urban couples to limit their family 
size, fueled the demand for contraceptives (Kwon 2001). Meanwhile, in the two 
decades after free, compulsory primary education was introduced in 1954, illiteracy was 
largely eradicated. (Kim 2002). 
 
Figure 1: Total fertility rates and the number of births in South Korea,  
1970–2010 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2014). 
 
 
The fertility decline started at the beginning of the 1960s. Viewing rapid 
population growth as a serious barrier to economic growth, the Korean government 
launched the National Family Planning Program in 1962 as a part of an economic 
development plan (for details, see Choe and Park 2006; Kwon 2001). The gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita grew rapidly from $92 in 1961 to $1,674 in 1980 
(The World Bank 2013). The aims of the family planning program were to reduce the 
desired family size and to promote modern contraceptive use, especially among specific 
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groups of the population. The program’s early focus was on reducing fertility rates 
among women in rural areas, where fertility was the highest and access to birth control 
was limited. The program was later extended to reach the poor and the factory workers 
in urban areas (Kwon 2001; Park et al. 1976). During this period, induced abortions 
were also widely performed, particularly among urban residents (Hong and Watson 
1972). In the 1970s, the government used incentives to encourage a two-child family 
norm, such as a tax deduction and benefits for public housing for couples with one or 
two children (Kwon 2001). 
At the same time, education about population growth was incorporated into 
secondary school curricula. Another factor that contributed to the fertility decline was 
mass internal migration from rural areas to cities. This movement was associated with 
rapid urbanization and industrialization, and tended to discourage childbearing as 
migrants struggled to adapt to city life (Lee and Farber 1984). In the 1960s and 1970s, 
the proportion of contraceptive users among married women quickly increased, from 
16% in 1965 to 44% in 1976 (Kwon 2001: 47). The family planning program was 
successful, as slogans such as “Have fewer children and bring them up well” and “Stop 
at two regardless of sex” were well received by the general public. At the same time, 
access to secondary school education was expanding rapidly, and opportunities to 
pursue higher education were growing at a moderate pace (Kim 2002). 
The period TFR reached the below-replacement level in 1983, and the period 
between 1980 and 1985 is often regarded as being the threshold for the post-transitional 
stage characterized by low fertility (Jun 2005; Kim 2005). Rapid economic growth 
continued as GDP per capita exceeded $2,000 in 1983 and reached $11,347 in 2000 
(The World Bank 2013). In the early 1980s, the pace of fertility decline began to slow. 
Despite having achieved a below-replacement level of fertility, the government 
maintained the family planning program; encouraging families to have fewer children 
and seeking to mitigate son preference, partly out of fear that there would be an 
absolute increase in the population as the large young cohorts entered their primary 
childbearing ages (Lee 2009). Thus, government policies continued to promote 
sterilization and provide incentives for restricting family size until the late 1980s. The 
sustained decline in period fertility rates finally caused the government to abandon the 
program in the late 1980s, leaving contraceptive distribution to the private and 
commercial sectors. Meanwhile, unbalanced sex ratios at birth and selective abortions 
emerged in the 1990s after new techniques for detecting the sex of the fetus were 
introduced (Larsen, Chung, and Das Gupta 1998). In 1996, the government officially 
adopted a new population policy with an emphasis on reproductive health care services. 
In 2001, the Korean period TFR reached 1.3, the lowest-low level of fertility as 
defined by Kohler and colleagues (2002). Since the early 1980s, access to higher 
education had expanded rapidly for both men and women, and women’s levels of 
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participation in social activities and labor have increased. More crucially, the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997 changed the paradigm on marriage and childbearing and 
augured a further decline in fertility (Kim 2009). The combination of changes in the 
status of women, growing economic insecurity, and insufficient childcare options led 
Koreans to delay marriage and childbearing (Jun 2005; Kim 2005; Suzuki 2005). In 
2003 the Korean government finally phased out the family planning program, which 
was by then more than 40 years old. A few years later, they adopted a set of pro-
natalistic policies aimed at helping the country prepare for a period of aging. These 
policies are described in the First Basic Planning for Low Fertility and Aged Society 
2006–2010, published in 2006 (Lee 2009). Despite this shift, Korean fertility is still 
under the lowest-low level, with a TFR of 1.19 in 2013 (Statistics Korea 2014). 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Data and measures 
This study relies on a series of sample data from the Korean Population and Household 
Census (hereafter, Korean census) between 1970 and 2010. The Korean census is 
conducted every five years by Statistics Korea. The census usually contains a short 
survey questionnaire on households and individuals, and in most cases includes a 
question on the number of children ever born. For my analysis, I decided to use 
questionnaires from seven of the nine censuses conducted between 1970 and 2010 (the 
census data for 1980 and 1995 do not contain pertinent information). Thus, the sample 
data were drawn from the censuses of 1970, 1975, 1985, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
I compute completed cohort fertility by averaging the children ever born to women 
aged 40–44. As in prior research (e.g., Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010), I consider ages 
40–44 as the end of women’s reproductive period. This age range was chosen for three 
main reasons: first, it reflects the census interval of five years; second, using ages 40–44 
allowed me to include more recent birth cohorts in the analysis; and third, because the 
proportion of births to women age 45 and older is very small, the level of completed 
fertility does not change significantly when women are measured at ages 45–49 or 50–
54.2 For the 1980 and 1995 censuses, in which the question of children ever born was 
omitted, the corresponding birth cohorts were selected at ages 45–49 from the censuses 
of 1985 and 2000, respectively. All of the information, including the number of children 
and educational attainment, is measured at ages 40–44 unless otherwise specified. The 
                                                          
2 Based on the data analyzed in this paper, for example, the computed completed fertility (CF) for the 1960 
birth cohort is 1.89, which is not far from the CF of 1.98 found when ages 50–54 are used for the end of 
women’s reproductive years. 
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questionnaire regarding the number of children ever born is retrospective, which means 
that the information provided may be inaccurate due to memory lapses or a failure to 
report children who died (Murphy 2009; Ní Bhrolcháin, Beaujouan, and Murphy 2011). 
In light of these concerns about the under-enumeration of children and selection caused 
by mortality differentials, responses from women over age 50 were excluded from the 
analysis. The sample size for each birth cohort ranges from a minimum of 1,389 to a 
maximum of 4,289. 
The educational attainment of the respondents was measured using six categories: 
incomplete primary education, completed primary education, completed lower-
secondary education, completed upper-secondary education, some college, and a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. These categories are designed to capture the rapid 
educational transition in Korea, including the dramatic improvements in female 
education.  
Like other social surveys in Korea, the census questionnaire asks only ever-
married women about their pregnancy and birth histories. As a result, information on 
children born to women who have never been married is not available. I assumed that 
all of the women who had never been married by age 40–44 were childless because 
nonmarital births are rare in Korea, and marriage is still nearly universal for women by 
the time they reach the end of their reproductive period (Jones and Gubhaju 2009). 
Even though the proportion of nonmarital births to all births was less than 1% in the 
1960s and slightly increased to 2.1% by 2012, nomarital births are still uncommon 
(Statistical Korea 2014). In addition, the data analyzed here suggest that approximately 
98% of women born between 1926 and 1970 were married by the ages of 40 to 44. 
There are also 187 cases with missing values for the number of children among ever-
married women aged 40–44. Because marriage and childbearing are virtually universal 
in Korea, childlessness may be considered shameful, and a non-response may be a way 
of avoiding a report of childlessness.3 Based on the assumption that the majority of the 
missing cases represent a non-response or avoidance by childless women at the end of 
their reproductive years, I classified those women as childless, and included them in my 
analysis in order to offset a possible underestimation of childless women. The number 
of these women is negligible, and their inclusion has a minimal effect on the results. 
Cases in which the educational attainment or the marital status were missing are simply 
omitted here because they made up less than 0.1% of the total sample size, and no 
regular pattern was found. 
 
 
                                                          
3 To confirm, I checked household information for the missing cases. Of those cases, around 76% had no 
children living in the household. Approximately three-quarters of the cases with missing data in the CEB may 
be attributable to ever-married women with no children. 
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4.2 Methods and strategy 
The analysis presented here is composed of three parts. First, I review educational 
differentials in completed fertility over 45 single-year birth cohorts. As my interest is in 
fertility differences across educational groups, completed cohort fertility can be 
expressed as a function of education-specific completed fertility and the composition of 
educational attainment. Because we consider only women at the end of their 
reproductive periods, age is not required in this formula. Education-specific completed 
fertility rates are measured for every five-year birth cohort for women born between 
1926 and 1970. The trends in education-specific completed fertility rates can be used to 
help us determine whether the pattern is closer to the leader-follower model or to the 
permanent difference model. 
Second, I utilize a demographic-decomposition technique. This technique can be 
used to compare demographic measures between two populations or the same 
population between two different times, and to separate the effect of changing a single 
factor from other effects (Das Gupta 1993; Romo 2003). In this paper, I isolate the 
effects of fertility rates (rate effects) from those of educational composition 
(composition effects). After specifying that completed cohort fertility for a birth cohort 
equals the sum—as i goes to j (the number of educational groups)—of the education-
specific fertility rate multiplied by the proportion of the corresponding educational 
group, the difference in completed fertility between the two birth cohorts is 
decomposed into change in the rates of completed fertility and change in the 
composition of educational attainment as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑎 =  �(𝑟𝑖𝑎 ∙ 𝑝𝑖𝑎)𝑗
𝑖
     (1) 
 
∆𝐶𝐹 = 𝐶𝐹𝑎 − 𝐶𝐹𝑏 =  �(𝑟𝑖𝑎 ∙ 𝑝𝑖𝑎)𝑗
𝑖
−  ��𝑟𝑖𝑏 ∙ 𝑝𝑖𝑏�𝑗
𝑖
     (2) 
 
In this equation, 𝐶𝐹𝑎 represents the completed cohort fertility for the birth cohort 
𝑎, ∆𝐶𝐹 is the change in completed cohort fertility between birth cohort a and b, 
𝑖 is the educational-level index, 𝑗 is the number of educational levels, 𝑟𝑖𝑎 is the 
completed fertility rate of group 𝑖 for the birth cohort a, and 𝑝𝑖𝑎 is the proportion of 
group 𝑖 for the birth cohort 𝑎.  
If we have two populations, we can evaluate the effect of a single factor on a 
standard population, which is acquired by averaging the other factor across both 
populations. However, the standardizing process is much more complicated when we 
have multiple populations. Das Gupta (1993) suggested a useful way to standardize 
demographic measures for multiple populations. His technique has frequently been used 
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in prior research, particularly when demographic trends have been analyzed (DeLeone, 
Lichter, and Strawderman 2009; Hayford 2005; Smith, Morgan, and Koropeckyj-Cox 
1996). Having nine different birth cohorts, I employ Das Gupta’s method to standardize 
completed fertility for multiple populations, and then break it down into six educational 
categories.4  
Finally, I use parity progression ratios to show the pattern of declining fertility 
across levels of education. A parity progression ratio is a demographic measure used to 
capture the proportion of women who have another child (parity k + 1) from a certain 
number of children (parity k) (Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001: 101–106). Parity 
progression ratios are simply parity-specific birth probabilities. Period parity 
progression ratios have often been used in prior research on fertility change (e.g., 
Feeney 1991). However, I use cohort parity progression ratios instead of period ratios, 
and further expand my calculation by the level of educational attainment in order to 
compare the trend of falling fertility across social strata: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑅(𝑘,𝑘+1) = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘+1 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 . (3) 
 
I compute cohort parity progression ratios for six educational groups and compare 
the patterns. After parity progression ratios are used to reveal the detailed pattern of 
fertility decline by birth parity, we are better able to compare changes in fertility 
outcomes across educational groups, and thus to discern the evolutionary pattern of 
educational differentials in fertility. Because of the small sample size for each 
educational group, especially among the oldest and youngest birth cohorts, I use a five-
year birth cohort instead of a single-year cohort for the decomposition and the parity 
progression ratios. 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Completed fertility and educational fertility differentials 
Figure 2 shows trends in educational attainment among women aged 40–44 for the 
corresponding 1926–1970 birth cohorts. The figure illustrates the marked expansion in 
women’s educational attainment between the 1926 and 1970 birth cohorts. For 
example, less than 5% of women born in 1926 had more than an upper-secondary 
education, compared with nearly 95% of women born in 1970. Similarly, the share of 
                                                          
4 The process of decomposing differences for polytomous-categorical variables is explained in Chevan and 
Sutherland (2009).  
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women who achieved some type of higher education increased from less than 1% to 
37% between two birth cohorts. 
 
Figure 2: Compositional change in the educational attainment of women aged 
40–44 for the 1926–1970 birth cohorts, South Korea 
 
Note: Author’s own calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the completed cohort fertility and educational differentials for 
women born between 1926 and 1970. There is a clear downward trend without temporal 
fluctuations in completed fertility among all of the cohorts. The average number of 
children per woman decreased by more than one-third over the 45 birth cohorts, from 
5.51 for the 1926 cohort to 1.73 for the 1970 cohort. The below-replacement level was 
reached when the 1957 birth cohort had 1.98 births per woman. The pace of the decline 
in completed fertility moderated after this point, but continued through to the most 
recent cohort. As was mentioned previously, the period TFR of Korea fell to 
replacement level between 1980 and 1985 (Jun 2005; Kim 2005). For the 1957 cohort 
of women, who would have started having children soon after marrying, the median age 
at first marriage was 23 (Table A1). If we assume that the primary childbearing ages of 
the 1957 were 23–27, we can see that there was a shift in both the cohort and the period 
fertility measures at this time, which was the point in the fertility transition at which 
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Korea started moving toward low fertility. The uninterrupted downward trend in 
completed fertility contrasts with the falling trend with fluctuations in period TFR 
shown in Figure 1. The trends look different because of the distinctive attributes of 
period TFR, which is overly sensitive to changes in the timing of fertility. For instance, 
the median age at first marriage was 18 among women born in 1926, but it increased to 
25 among women born in 1970, and to 29 among women born in 1980 (Table A1). In 
the Korean context, in which marriage is universal, these shifts in the timing of 
marriage are closely connected to shifts in the timing of fertility. This pattern produces 
a tempo effect that results in an underestimation of period fertility rates (Bongaarts and 
Feeney 1998). 
 
Figure 3: Educational differentials in completed cohort fertility for women 
born between 1926 and 1970, South Korea 
 
Note: Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3 also displays the educational differentials in completed fertility and how 
they change over time. In the figure, the education-specific completed fertility shows 
that, by and large, women’s educational attainment is negatively associated with 
completed fertility: the higher a woman’s educational level, the fewer children she has. 
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degree among the oldest cohorts, and among women with an incomplete primary 
education among the youngest cohorts, are largely due to the small sample sizes. 
Overall, the completed cohort fertilities for all of the educational groups declined 
across the 1926 and 1970 cohorts in Korea. Despite some variation in the slope across 
the levels of education, it is evident that a sharp fall in fertility took place among 
women at all educational levels. The group with the lowest level of education—i.e., an 
incomplete primary education—experienced the largest decline in fertility, from 5.89 
for the 1926 cohort to 1.50 for the 1970 cohort. 
Meanwhile, the educational differentials in completed fertility almost disappeared 
among recent birth cohorts with sub-replacement fertility. When we use five-year birth 
cohorts to mitigate temporal fluctuations between cohorts, we find that the difference 
between the highest and lowest fertility groups was 2.44 (42% relative difference) 
among the 1926–1930 cohort, but that this gap shrank to 0.29 (14% relative difference) 
among the latest 1966–1970 cohort. The lines for education-specific fertility rates have 
converged below the replacement level at between 1.7 and 2.0. These findings are 
surprising given that previous studies have argued that educational differentials in 
fertility remain significant even in post-transitional societies (Bongaarts 2003). Despite 
the unprecedented expansion in women’s education in Korea, fertility differentials by 
level of education have faded considerably across the 45 single-year cohorts studied. 
The analysis shows that, among the youngest birth cohorts, the two extreme ends 
of the educational spectrum—i.e., the highest and the lowest educational groups—had 
the lowest fertility levels. Interestingly, the least-educated women born in 1926, or 
those with incomplete primary education, had on average the highest number of 
children; while the least-educated women born in 1970 had the second-lowest number 
of children. Meanwhile, women with a bachelor’s degree or higher had some of the 
lowest fertility rates across the cohorts. The lower fertility of both groups among the 
recent birth cohorts is attributable in part to a recent rise in never-married women in 
those groups. When the 1966–1970 cohorts reached ages 40–44 in 2010 (Statistics 
Korea 2014), the proportions of women who had never married was 25.3% among 
those with an incomplete primary education and 9.3% among those with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. These shares were higher than the proportion of the entire 1966–1970 
cohort who had never married (6.2%), and were far higher than that of the 1926–1930 
cohort (0.4% in 1970). A possible explanation for these trends is that when primary 
school completion is mandatory, women with an incomplete primary education are 
more likely to be socially disadvantaged or physically/mentally disabled, and would 
therefore have difficulties finding an appropriate partner. Meanwhile, as the age at first 
marriage rose steadily, the share of women who remained single through the end of the 
reproductive span gradually increased, especially among those with the most education. 
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5.2 Was the fertility decline in Korea driven by educational expansion? 
Table 1 shows the change in completed cohort fertility and its decomposition results for 
five-year birth cohorts. The bottom section of the table provides a comparison between 
the oldest and youngest birth cohorts. Due to small sample sizes, five-year birth cohorts 
are used instead of single-year birth cohorts. 
 
Table 1: Standardization and decomposition of the change in completed 
fertility between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 birth cohorts 
 A. Standardization and decomposition of change in completed fertility   
Birth cohort CF CF standardized except Observed change in CF Change attributable to 
Fertility  
rates 
Educational 
 composition 
Rate effects Composition effects 
C1926–1930 5.36 4.83 3.49       
C1931–1935 4.78 4.34 3.41 -0.58 (100%) -0.49 (85%) -0.09 (15%) 
C1936–1940 4.07 3.79 3.25 -0.71 (100%) -0.55 (78%) -0.16 (22%) 
C1941–1945 3.41 3.26 3.11 -0.66 (100%) -0.52 (79%) -0.14 (21%) 
C1946–1950 2.79 2.79 2.97 -0.62 (100%) -0.48 (77%) -0.14 (23%) 
C1951–1955 2.29 2.35 2.91 -0.50 (100%) -0.44 (88%) -0.06 (12%) 
C1956–1960 1.96 2.08 2.85 -0.33 (100%) -0.27 (81%) -0.06 (19%) 
C1961–1965 1.88 2.04 2.80 -0.09 (100%) -0.04 (42%) -0.05 (58%) 
C1966–1970 1.84 2.05 2.75 -0.04 (100%) 0.01 (-31%) -0.05 (131%) 
 B. Decomposition of change in CF between the oldest (c1926–1930) and youngest (c1966–1970) cohorts 
Birth cohort (by level of education) Observed 
change in 
CF 
Change in standardized CF* Change attributable to 
Rate effects Composition effects 
C1926–1930  /  c1966–1970 -3.52 -3.52 (100%) -2.78 (79%) -0.74 (21%) 
Incomplete primary   -2.80 (80%) -0.82 (23%) -1.98 (56%) 
Completed primary   -2.03 (57%) -0.86 (24%) -1.17 (33%) 
Lower secondary  -0.18 (5%) -0.33 (9%) 0.15 (-4%) 
Upper secondary  0.84 (-24%) -0.55 (16%) 1.39 (-40%) 
Some college  0.27 (-8%) -0.08 (2%) 0.34 (-10%) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher or more  0.38 (-11%) -0.15 (4%) 0.53 (-15%) 
 
Note: * For the six educational categories, standardized CFs for component were used. 
 
 
While completed fertility declined continuously from the 1926–1930 cohorts to the 
1966–1970 cohorts, both the rate effects and the composition effects changed in 
different directions. Rate effects accounted for about four-fifths of the observed changes 
in fertility between the cohorts until the 1956–1960 birth cohort. The rate effects over 
the fertility change declined for the 1961–1965 cohort, and finally began operating in 
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the opposite direction for the most recent cohorts (-31% for the 1966–1970 birth 
cohort). In contrast, composition effects accounted for about one-fifth of the decline in 
fertility for most of the birth cohorts, but the contribution of the composition effects to 
fertility decline soared among the most recent birth cohorts with sub-replacement 
fertility. Although the observed change in fertility is small, the compositional change 
among the 1966–1970 cohort covers more than just the fertility difference from the 
previous cohort. 
Section B at the bottom of Table 1 summarizes the results of the decomposition of 
the change in completed fertility between the 1926–1930 cohort and the 1966–1970 
cohort, and their extension for the six educational categories based on composition-
standardized completed fertility. The results reveal that four-fifths (79%) of the change 
in completed fertility (-3.52 per woman) between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 
cohorts was attributable to changes in fertility behaviors (rate effects), and that the 
expansion of women’s education accounted for one-fifth (21%) of the change. Dividing 
the decomposition into educational categories demonstrates how each group contributed 
to the change in fertility in terms of rate and composition effects. When it comes to rate 
effects, the contributions of the lower educational groups were especially pronounced. 
For instance, the changes in the fertility rates of women with incomplete or completed 
primary education accounted for 23% or 24%, respectively, of the fertility change that 
occurred between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 cohorts. The group of women with 
upper-secondary education accounted for 16% of the fertility changes between these 
cohorts. However, the contribution to falling fertility of the rate effects of women with 
higher education remained marginal: 2% for women with some college and 4% for 
women with a bachelor’s degree or higher.  
The composition effects by level of education were more dynamic. The 
composition effect of incomplete primary education alone explained 56% of the overall 
change in fertility; this effect is the largest of all of the rate and composition effects by 
level of education. Similarly, the compositional change in completed primary education 
was responsible for 33% of the entire change in fertility. The bulk of the composition 
effects among the lower educational groups may be attributed to free, compulsory 
primary education. These large composition effects were, however, offset to a 
considerable extent by those of more educated groups which operated in the opposite 
direction (40% for upper-secondary education, 10% for some college, and 15% for a 
bachelor’s degree or higher). Such composition effects indicate that the rapid 
improvements in women’s educational attainment levels achieved in Korea did not 
necessarily involve a corresponding drop in fertility when rate effects were controlled 
for. Specifically, the composition effects caused by a decrease in the proportion of the 
less-educated group were canceled out by the opposite effects caused by a subsequent 
rise in the shares of groups with the next-highest educational levels (not shown here). 
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Despite the impressive gains made in women’s educational attainment, composition 
effects were found to account for just one-fifth of the entire fertility change during the 
analyzed interval.  
When we looked at rate effects and composition effects combined, it became clear 
that the two groups with the lowest educational levels—i.e., incomplete and completed 
primary education—were mainly responsible for the fertility change. The sum of the 
rate and composition effects for the two groups was large enough to cover the entire 
fertility decline. The substantial declines in fertility among the two groups also 
contributed to the narrowing of the fertility gaps across levels of education among the 
younger cohorts. 
Meanwhile, completed fertility fell below the replacement level among the 1956–
1960 cohort. Thereafter, the distribution of both the rate and the composition effects 
changed, and became different from that of prior birth cohorts. The cohorts of women 
born after 1960 were the first generation who benefited from the expansion of higher 
education in the early 1980s. The shift in the pattern of rate and composition effects 
after the 1961–1965 cohort suggests that Korea had entered the Second Demographic 
Transition.  
The average number of children per woman declined by as much as 3.52 between 
the 1926–1930 and the 1966–1970 cohorts, and the majority of that change was 
attributable to changes in fertility behaviors. Despite the marked transition in women’s 
educational attainment in South Korea, and contrary to expectations, we found that 
educational expansion accounted for only one-fifth of the fertility decline between the 
1926–1930 and the 1966–1970 cohorts, or a drop in completed fertility of 0.74 children 
per woman. The considerable composition effects of the lower educational groups on 
falling fertility were offset by the opposite effects due to subsequent growth in the 
higher educational groups. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the expansion of 
women’s educational attainment was the main driver of the fertility decline during the 
Korean fertility transition. 
 
 
5.3 Can a leader-follower model explain the fertility decline in South Korea? 
As can be seen in Figure 3, fertility rates by level of education are converging. The 
literature has suggested that this kind of convergence generally occurs when falling 
fertility spreads successively from leader to follower (Bongaarts 2003; Cleland 2002). 
Figure 3 does not provide clear evidence of whether the pattern is close to the leader-
follower model. To explore this pattern in more depth, I present cohort parity 
progression ratios in Figure 4. Some of the progression lines were omitted due to the 
small sample size. In the figure, parity progression rates to parity three (PPR2) and 
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parity four (PPR3) fell considerably for all of the educational levels for the analyzed 
birth cohorts, while progression rates to parity one (PPR0) and to parity two (PPR1) 
changed little. These changes suggest that the fertility decline in Korea was mainly 
attributable to the transition from having four or more children to having two children. 
 
Figure 4: Cohort parity-progression ratios by the level of women’s educational 
attainment between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 birth cohorts, 
South Korea 
 
 
Note: In cases in which an educational group represents less than 1% of the samples for the corresponding cohort, the parity 
progression ratios for the group were omitted in the figure above. Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data 
between 1970 and 2010. 
 
 
The salient feature of the figure is that education-specific patterns of parity 
progression represent the stages in the progression of the fertility transition. For 
example, the shapes of the parity progression ratios for the middle levels of education—
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i.e., lower- and upper-secondary education—are similar to those of the entire Korean 
population in the transition from high to low parities: the progression rates to third and 
fourth births declined considerably, while the progression rates to first and second 
births remained stable (Choe and Retherford 2009). Interestingly, the pattern of parity 
progression ratios for incomplete primary education is also analogous to the beginning 
stage of the transition, when the shift from high to low parities began. In contrast, the 
patterns for a bachelor’s degree or a higher education seem to indicate the start of a 
post-transitional stage or of a new set of demographic patterns (the Second 
Demographic Transition); the progressions to third and fourth births stabilized at low 
levels, and the progression to a second birth began to decline in recent cohorts. Overall, 
the figure indicates that the pattern of falling parity progression ratios first began among 
the most educated group (bachelor’s degree or higher) and soon started to take hold 
among the group with the next-highest level of education. This sequential decline in 
parity progression, which is consistent with prior research (Cleland 2002), provides 
evidence that lower fertility spread from highly educated women (forerunners) to less 
educated women (followers) during the fertility transition in Korea. 
The decline in progression ratios to third-parity births (PPR2) across levels of 
women’s education is more distinctive. Falling progression ratios of third births 
occurred almost at the same time, but shifted from the more-educated to the less-
educated groups. Table 2 shows which birth cohorts first experienced significant 
declines in the progression ratio to third births by women’s educational levels. Here, I 
chose the parity progression ratio of 0.7 for the onset of parity-specific fertility decline, 
and 0.4 for the loss of parity-specific predominance. Although the choice of thresholds 
was arbitrary to some degree, it provided a useful way to look at the changes in the 
fertility pattern. As we can see in Table 2, the level of education was associated with the 
order of the birth cohort who first experienced “significant” declines in the progression: 
the higher educational group experienced an earlier drop in the parity progression ratio 
to third births. 
Although some of the groups appear to overlap when we attempt to determine 
which of the birth cohorts first experienced such changes, the table shows that the 
pattern of falling fertility progressed through educational pathways. The progression 
ratios to the third birth declined with each level of education. For the two most-
educated groups—i.e., some college and a bachelor’s degree and higher—the 
progression to a third birth began to fall below 0.7 in the 1936–1940 birth cohort and 
reached 0.4 in the 1946–1950 birth cohort. A similar trajectory could be observed 
among the groups that followed: from upper secondary, to lower secondary, to 
completed primary, to incomplete primary education. The spread of the decrease in the 
progression ratio to below 0.4 was even faster than to below 0.7, and the time lag 
between the educational groups declined from a 15-year to a 10-year cohort interval. 
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However, none of the groups who experienced a parity progression ratio to second 
births (PPR1) fell below 0.7, except for the group with incomplete primary education. 
Despite substantial changes in fertility patterns, the progression to a first and a second 
birth have been consistently maintained by the majority of women, which implies that a 
two-child family norm has been well established in Korea. For those with incomplete 
primary education, the parity progression ratio to parity two reached 0.7 among the 
1961–1965 cohort, but its impact on the overall trend can be ignored because the 
corresponding cohorts came from generations in which free, compulsory primary 
education had been instituted (less than 1% of the cohorts). 
 
Table 2: The first birth cohort reached below 0.7 or 0.4 of parity progression 
ratios by level of women’s educational attainment 
 Parity progression ratio to third births (PPR2) 
Level of education  below 0.7 below 0.4 
Incomplete primary  c1951–1955 c1956–1960 
Completed primary  c1951–1955 c1956–1960 
Lower secondary c1946–1950 c1951–1955 
Upper secondary c1941–1945 c1951–1955 
Some college c1936–1940 c1946–1950 
Bachelor’s degree or higher c1936–1940 c1946–1950 
 
Note: Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 2010. 
 
 
The results of the cohort parity progression analysis offer evidence that the pattern 
of the Korean fertility transition most closely conforms to the leader-follower model. 
Although fertility fell in all of the educational groups with a small variation in birth 
cohorts, the decline definitely spread from the most- to the least-educated groups. In 
addition, despite the sustained low fertility in Korea, the two-child family norm seems 
to be firmly established in all of the educational groups, and the tendency to have a 
third child has declined considerably during the transition. This striking transformation 
in parity progression patterns was completed in just 40 years of birth cohorts. 
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6. Conclusions and discussion 
South Korea experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility of any country in the 
late 20th century. The aim of this paper was to identify how educational differentials in 
fertility changed over the Korean fertility transition, and to understand the contribution 
of changes in educational attainment to the fertility decline among women born 
between 1926 and 1970. 
Completed fertility declined from 5.51 for women born in 1926 to 1.73 for women 
born in 1970. Educational differentials in completed fertility have gradually decreased. 
Although marginal differences still remain, the once-obvious gaps in lifetime fertility 
by level of education disappeared among the birth cohorts of women who just ended 
their reproductive periods. In the recent cohorts, women at both extremes of the 
educational spectrum had the lowest levels of completed fertility. This finding blurs the 
negative association between fertility and women’s education that was clearly observed 
in the early stages of the transition. Overall, educational differentials in completed 
fertility faded away as the transition reached its end. This convergence of educational 
differentials in fertility is surprising because it contradicts previous research showing 
that the fertility gaps between educational groups are substantial in most societies, even 
those in the end- or post-transitional stage (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008; Alves and 
Cavenaghi 2009; Bongaarts 2003, 2010). 
The extraordinary decline in fertility in Korea was mainly attributable to 
decreasing fertility in every social group for the cohorts who were having children prior 
to the point when the replacement level was reached. Women’s educational attainment 
did not start to play a large role in fertility changes until after this point. While the rapid 
increase in women’s educational attainment was virtually unprecedented, it still only 
accounted for one-fifth of the fertility decline during the transition in Korea. The pattern 
of fertility differentials by level of education in Korea appears to have conformed with 
the leader-follower model rather than with the permanent-difference model (Bongaarts 
2003; Cleland 2002). Having experienced more rapid fertility decline, the Korean 
pattern could be identified through cohort parity progression ratios by level of 
education. The trends in parity progression ratios demonstrate that the decline in 
fertility spread from the most-educated to the least-educated groups during the fertility 
transition, and that the norm of a two-child family became established across all social 
strata in Korea. Such a rapid transformation of fertility patterns cannot occur without 
the extensive diffusion and social interactions of small family norms and contraceptive 
use, as prior research has discussed (Chung and Das Gupta 2007; Kye 2012; 
Montgomery and Chung 1999).  
Differences in rates of diffusion and social interactions may lead to further 
variation in the dynamic pattern of educational differentials in fertility across countries 
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(Bongaarts 2003). For instance, family planning programs can reduce the fertility gap 
across social strata by helping to meet the contraceptive needs of disadvantaged women 
(Amaral and Potter 2009). In Korea, the family planning program was initially targeted 
at women in rural areas with high fertility rates and limited access to birth control 
(Kwon 2001). As the result of active fieldwork and campaigns, contraceptive use and 
the small family norm spread from one group to another (Montgomery and Chung 
1999; Park et al. 1976). In countries in the  late-transitional stages, in which most of the 
differences in fertility rates come from differences in rates of unwanted pregnancies 
(Bongaarts 2003, 2010), family planning programs may be more useful than is 
generally expected in narrowing the fertility gap across social strata. Without such 
efforts, fertility differentials by social strata may remain significant even after countries 
lower their overall fertility to replacement levels, as in the case in Brazil (Alves and 
Cavenaghi 2009; Lam and Duryea 1999).  
For the same reason, the degree of homogeneity in a society could influence the 
extent of fertility differentials. Innovative ideas and behaviors may spread more quickly 
in a homogenous society than in a heterogeneous society once the adoption of the 
innovation reaches a certain threshold. Located on a small peninsula in which the land 
route north has long been closed by the political conflict with North Korea, South 
Korea is an ethnically homogenous society with a single language. Having a relatively 
homogenous culture and geographic constraints likely facilitates social interaction and 
the diffusion of innovative ideas and behaviors in Korea. Thus, the Korean pattern of 
educational differentials in fertility may differ from the patterns found in other 
countries.  
Internal migration might have contributed to the converging patterns of fertility 
differentials. Industrialization and urbanization triggered large-scale internal migrations 
from rural to urban areas between the 1960s and 1980s in Korea. Internal migrants from 
rural areas contributed to the decline in fertility through their acceptance of 
contraceptive use and the small family norm (Lee and Farber 1984; Lee and Pol 1993). 
However, because most of the people affected by this trend were from birth cohorts 
involved in the early phases of the transition, internal migration probably did not play 
an important role in the overall pattern of fertility differentials.  
When interpreting the results of this study, several points should be noted. First, 
these findings should be differentiated from research based on period fertility. Cohort 
fertility measured at the end of the reproductive span is usually less responsive than 
period fertility in reflecting the dynamic changes in fertility at younger ages. Although 
completed cohort fertility may mask qualitative aspects of fertility behaviors, such as 
birth timing and birth spacing, it is relatively stable and precise. By contrast, period 
measures of fertility may present a distorted picture, especially when the timing of 
childbearing changes as rapidly as it did in Korea (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). 
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Second, the findings do not indicate that improvements in women’s educational 
attainment are not a necessary prerequisite for fertility decline. My analysis showed that 
a considerable portion of the fertility decline was attributable to compositional changes 
in the lower educational groups, caused by the introduction of universal primary 
education. In addition, education helped to spread new ideas and values. This paper 
supports the hypothesis that mass education provides a solid foundation for fertility 
decline in both direct and indirect ways, and that the indirect effects of education on 
fertility are greater than the direct effects (Axinn and Barber 2001; Caldwell 1980). 
This study also has a few limitations. First, I could not use detailed information on 
fertility other than number of children ever born. Educational differentials in completed 
fertility can be further decomposed into differences in wanted and unwanted fertility, 
and their contributions to fertility differentials also vary with the stages of the transition 
(Bongaarts 2003; Musick et al. 2009). Once better data become available, decomposing 
the fertility difference and how it changes over time would be an interesting topic. 
Second, the completed fertility rates used here may have been marginally 
underestimated due to data limitations, although this did not appear to make a 
meaningful difference in the results. With the data for Korea that are currently 
available, it is difficult to estimate the exact levels of fertility for women with non-
traditional childbearing histories, such as those who had out-of-wedlock births or are 
childless. Finally, as the information on children ever born comes from retrospective 
questions, the number may be underestimated due to incorrect recall or the omission of 
children who died. 
Despite these shortcomings, this paper provides a rare look at how educational 
differentials in fertility change in a country that has experienced a rapid decline in 
fertility as part of a fertility transition. In Korea, the sustained low fertility has brought 
on social concerns in recent years. However, looking at cohort fertility rather than 
period fertility, raises the question of whether or not the Korean fertility has reached the 
lowest-low level. Researchers and policy-makers should pay more attention to the 
timing of fertility inherent in period fertility, especially in countries where the ages at 
childbearing change as rapidly as they have been in Korea (Bongaarts and Feeney 
1998). The effects of education on fertility decline are diverse and vary according to the 
conditions of each country. The Korean pattern of educational differentials in fertility 
illustrates the need for a more comprehensive investigation of the relationship between 
education and fertility transitions. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Median age at first marriage for women born between 1926 and 
1980, South Korea 
Cohort Median age Cohort Median age Cohort Median age Cohort Median age 
c1926 18 c1940 22 c1954 23 c1968 25 
c1927 18 c1941 22 c1955 23 c1969 25 
c1928 18 c1942 23 c1956 23 c1970 25 
c1929 18 c1943 23 c1957 23 c1971 26 
c1930 19 c1944 23 c1958 23 c1972 26 
c1931 19 c1945 23 c1959 23 c1973 26 
c1932 20 c1946 23 c1960 24 c1974 27 
c1933 20 c1947 24 c1961 24 c1975 27 
c1934 20 c1948 24 c1962 24 c1976 27 
c1935 20 c1949 24 c1963 24 c1977 27 
c1936 21 c1950 24 c1964 24 c1978 28 
c1937 21 c1951 23 c1965 25 c1979 29 
c1938 22 c1952 23 c1966 25 c1980 29 
c1939 22 c1953 23 c1967 25 
   
Note: Author’s calculations with a life-table method, based on women’s age at first marriage from the Korean census sample data of 
1980, 1995, 2005, and 2010; Extra birth cohorts of women born between1971 and1980 were added to provide recent trends in 
the timing of marriage. 
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